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书名:Psychosemantics:The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind
作者:Jerry A. Fodor (Author) 出版社:The MIT Press (September 7, 1989) 语言: English ISBN-10: 0262560526 ISBN-13: 978-0262560528 Editorial Reviews From Library Journal Cognitivism argues that psychology studies behavior to infer unobservable theoretical constructs, such as `belief,' that summarize and explain empirical observations and predict new phenomena. Here, Fodor tries to provide a scientific account of commonsense belief/desire psychology by defending a representational theory of mind. Assuming that there is no alternative to the vocabulary of commonsense psychological explanation, he proposes that we have an infinite set of mental symbols at our disposal and that a propositional attitude is equivalent to a symbol's occurring and its functioning in a particular causal role. Underlying his account is the view that mental processes will turn out to be physical processes. Highly recommended for philosophers of mind and cognitive psychologists. Robert Hoffman, Philosophy Department, York Coll., CUNY Copyright 1987 Reed Business Information, Inc. --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title. Review "(Fodor's) aim in this book is to protect folk psychology, as a solid basis for mental science, from a range of objections that have been brought against it in recent years, mainly by philosophers. He does so with verve, clarity and wit, generally getting the better of his revisionary opponents. The book is vintage Fodor: clever, stimulating, challenging, infuriating." - Colin McGinn, Nature http://ifile.it/vhu2qo9 |
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【英】心理语义学:心智哲学中的意义问题
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